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FEDERALIST SOCIETY’S DEBATE ON 
OPEN SOURCE & INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
 
INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR MARCUS COLE OF 
         STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, MODERATOR 
 
      PROFESSOR COLE:  Good afternoon, and welcome to 
the debate.  On behalf of the Federalist Society for Law and 
Public Policy Studies, my name is Professor Marcus Cole 
from Stanford Law School, and I'd like to welcome you here 
to our debate. It includes two experts on the relationship 
between open source and traditional notions of intellectual 
property rights. 
      The open source movement has debated the traditional 
notions of intellectual property rights, and proponents of it have 
suggested that it is the bedrock of a new business model that is 
going to stimulate innovation and creativity and create a world 
that we want to live in.  Traditionalists with respect to 
intellectual property rights say that we've seen this before and  
. . . infractions of property rights do anything but stimulate 
innovation and creativity.  In fact, to the contrary, in order to 
have innovation and creativity, you have to promote property 
rights. 
      Today, we have two experts on both sides of this issue. 
My colleague Lawrence Lessig is the C. Wendell and Edith M. 
Carlsmith Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, where he's 
also the founder of Stanford's Center for Internet and Society.  
Professor Lessig teaches and writes in the areas of 
constitutional law, contracts, comparative constitutional law, 
and the law of cyberspace.  Most recently, Professor Lessig 
represented website operator Eric Eldred in the ground-
breaking case of Eldred v. Ashcroft 1  in the United States 
Supreme Court in his challenge to the 1998 Sony Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act.2  He is the author of The Future 
                                            
1 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
2 Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).  
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of Ideas3 and Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace,4 and he also 
chairs the Creative Comments Project.  He's also a board 
member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and a board 
member for the Center for the Public Domain. 
     Scott Kieff is Associate Professor, Washington University 
School of Law and National Fellow at the Hoover Institution 
here at Stanford.  Professor Kieff also teaches and writes in the 
area of intellectual property and is the author of several 
publications, including Perspectives on Properties of The 
Human Genome Project5 , The Case Against Copyright - a 
Comparative Institutional Analysis of Intellectual Property 
Regimes6 and a textbook on the Principles of Patent Law.7  He 
is a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
     Now, the way we will all proceed today is that we'll lead off 
with Professor Lessig, and he'll talk for several minutes 
followed by Professor Kieff.  And then we'll have brief 
rebuttals and then an opportunity for you to ask questions.  
With that, I give you Professor Lawrence Lessig.  
 
I.  THE OPEN SOURCE MOVEMENT, PRESENTED BY 
             PROFESSOR LAWRENCE LESSIG OF STANFORD LAW  
             SCHOOL 
 
PROFESSOR LESSIG:  Of course, consistent with Federalist 
principles, he's actually sold you Professor Lessig.  You haven't 
                                            
   3LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE 
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (Vintage 2002) (2001). 
   4 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic 
Books 2000) (1999). 
   5 F. Scott Kieff, Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome  
Project, in 50 ADVANCES IN GENETICS, (Academic Press, 2003). 
   6 Kieff, F. Scott Kieff, The Case against Copyright: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis of Intellectual Property Regimes, (October 2004). 
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 297; Washington 
U. School of Law Working Paper No. 04-10-01 (October 2004)., 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=600802 or 
DOI:  10.2139/ssrn.600802  
   7 F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL.,PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, University 
Casebook Series, Foundation Press (4th ed. 2008).  
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been given the et al., and then I'm going to exact a price for this 
infraction here, which is that you follow me in thinking 
differently about this issue around open source. 
     When I was asked to talk, I was told actually that I was 
going to talk about open source and Scott was going to talk 
about IP.  And that of course is consistent with most people's 
view in the bar about my understanding about IP, which is that 
I have no understanding of IP, so it's better if I don't talk about 
it.  First, I want to frame the open source part of the debate, and 
I'm then happy to respond to some of Scott's views about IP, 
although it turns out, I think, we both think pretty much the 
same thing about the issues in IP. 
     What I'm going to start with are some characterizations of 
the issues around open source or free software as a way to 
reorient a debate that has a too-familiar left-right component to 
it, and I think unhealthily left-right components of it.  So here 
are the submissions to this. 
     In October of 2002, Congressman Adam Smith wrote a 
letter to, then, Richard Clark, who was in charge of these 
matters, telling him that the GPL, which of course is the license 
under which most free software projects are licensed, including 
the GNU Linux Operating System, is a threat to both 
“innovation and security.”  GPL ‘prevents companies from 
adopting, improving, commercializing and deriving profits 
from software.”  That's point one. 
     Here's story two.  July 2003, a group called CP Tech asked 
WIPO the World Intellectual Property Organization to hold a 
meeting to address "open and collaborative model for 
developing public goods."  It had in mind things like science, 
which is an open collaborative model for developing public 
goods.  The public good is knowledge, open and collaborative 
in the sense that you share the knowledge and other people add 
to it or criticize it as a way to advance that production of public 
goods. 
     But in the context of the request, CP Tech made a list of 
examples that they thought were emblematic of the type of 
resource that they were thinking of: the IETF and open network 
protocols that produced the Internet; the development of free 
and open source software; the worldwide web, which was built 
on protocols which are themselves in the public domain; the 
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Human Genome Project; the SNIP Consortium; the open access 
in scientific journals that make work available under free 
licenses; and my favorite example, the gift of Ronald Reagan to 
technological innovation in the 1980s and 1990s, the Global 
Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan turned over to the 
public for whatever use they'd like to make on top of it, 
including commercial and non-commercial use.  And that, of 
course, engendered all sorts of innovation around that 
technology. 
     Now, the mistake of CP Tech in making this request of 
WIPO, a strategic mistake, was that they included free and 
open source software in their list, examples of great 
collaborative projects for producing public goods, because that 
inspired the Microsoft lobbying machine to kick into gear and 
succeed in achieving a veto on the United States' participation 
in this meeting, and then a veto of the meeting itself. 
     Lois Boland at the PTO had this to say about the idea behind 
the meeting.  She said, “Open source software runs counter to 
the mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual property 
rights.”  She said, “To hold a meeting which has as its purpose 
to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to 
the goals of WIPO.” 
     That’s story two. Here's story three.  In December 2003, a 
guy named Darl McBride, who was running the SCO 
Corporation, wrote an open letter to Congress and the public 
asserting that the GPL violates the United States Constitution.  
SCO argued that the authority of the Congress under the United 
States Constitution to promote the progress of science in useful 
arts inherently includes a profit motive, and that protection for 
this profit motive includes a constitutional dimension. Those 
who designed the GPL readily admit that they created this 
license to have the effect of “freeing software,” taking it out of 
the realm of copyright protection by placing it in the public 
domain. 
     These three stories reveal extraordinarily important mistakes 
to which we need to develop antibodies in response.  Let's start 
with the second of them, Lois Boland.  She says, “Open source 
software runs counter to the mission of WIPO, which is to 
promote intellectual property rights.” 
     Obviously, the mistake here is that open source and free 
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software is software that licenses intellectual property rights.  
There is no possibility of the free software movement or the 
open source movement without the underlying IP under which 
the software is licensed.  So, it's not counter to IP.  In fact, it 
depends on IP for the systems of innovation to be supported.  If 
these bits of code were in the public domain, then there would 
be no capacity of the GPL or any other open source license to 
restrict how people used or developed that software.   
     Secondly, notice her characterization of what we think 
WIPO's goal is.  Remember, she says, “To hold a meeting 
which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights seems 
to us to be contrary to the goals of WIPO.”  To “disclaim or 
waive such rights?”  One should ask, whose property is it?  
Why does WIPO care what holders of intellectual property 
rights do with their rights?  Do people who defend physical 
property rights complain when Bill Gates gives $20 billion to 
help children in Africa?  The idea of property is that the 
property holder gets to choose how to license his or her 
property rights.  And the idea that an organization -- worse, a 
UN organization -- would have a right to object to how 
property rights are deployed is anathema to the nature of what a 
property right should be. 
     Now consider Mr. Smith's view.  Smith says, "GPL prevents 
companies from adopting, improving, commercializing and 
deriving profits from software."  There's a conflation here, 
which is the suggestion that the only way to commercialize 
software is for that software to be proprietary.  There are plenty 
of companies which commercialize GPL software or build 
businesses on top of GPL software.  The distinction is not 
between commercial and non-commercial activity; the 
distinction is between proprietary and non-proprietary software.  
And to the extent there is commercial activity built on non-
proprietary software, the battle against non-proprietary software 
is something other than a battle against anti-commercialism.   
     Finally, my favorite -- Darl.  Again, to the extent Darl thinks 
free software is about placing stuff in the public domain, he 
simply doesn't understand the way open source and free 
software functions.  It's not in the public domain.  And to the 
extent he says that the Constitution mandates a profit motive, 
what he's really saying is that there's a profit motive of a 
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particular kind: namely, a profit motive that is driven by 
exclusive control over the distribution of copies or deliberative 
rights associated with a particular bit of IP.  It's not profit 
motive in a broader sense because again, IBM, which is a 
strong supporter of free software, is certainly motivated profit. 
     And finally, of course, to the extent he says that a license 
could violate the United States Constitution, there's of course 
no possible way that a private license can violate the United 
States Constitution.  So here are the principles that I think we 
should be able to extract about the way free and open source 
software functions, and then I want to quiz you by applying it 
to a particular argument that Microsoft has advanced in this 
context.   
     First, free and open source software is property, the owners 
are exercising their property rights as they see fit, and there 
should be no systematic objection of that exercise of property 
rights. 
     Second, free and open source software is inviting a 
particular kind of innovation.  It's not trying to control access to 
the underlying code but it's inviting innovation really at a 
different layer of a stack of innovation.  We see lots of 
innovation, for example, in the embedded systems market 
where you've got computers embedded in chips to be 
embedded in telephones.  The operating system for many of 
these is the GNU/Linux Operating System, but one wouldn't 
say that there's no innovation in the cell phone market or 
innovation in the embedded systems market.  There's a ton of 
innovation; it's just a different kind of innovation. 
     Third, free and open source software can offer values that 
proprietary software cannot.  First of all, it can offer things to 
government that proprietary software cannot.  For example, 
many of you have probably heard of the Carnivore System, 
which the FBI had commissioned to develop to make it 
possible to search emails.  The theory of Carnivore was that 
you could get a court order that would say I want to collect 
emails to and from a certain person, and the Carnivore system 
attached to an ISP's email server would only collect those 
emails.  It wouldn't read any of the content.  It would just 
collect emails based on the header information. 
     Well, people said, how do we know?  The government said, 
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we're the government; trust us. Obviously, people said, no; we'd 
like to know how you're going to prove to us that in fact this is 
doing what you say it's doing, and the government said, well, 
what do you want us to do?  And they said, show us the code.  
And the government said, well, we have a contract with the 
people who wrote the Carnivore, that we won't show you the 
code. 
     Of course, what that meant is nobody could trust what the 
government said the product was.  If it had been free and open 
source software, perhaps they would have had to pay more for 
the code, but by paying more for the code they would have 
avoided extraordinary, lengthy, and costly proceedings around 
trying to demonstrate whether in fact the code did what the 
government said it was doing. 
     And secondly, free and open source software is providing a 
value to developing nations that proprietary code is not.  
Governments like Brazil are, of course, pushing free and open 
source software.  They believe it's going to be not only less 
expensive to them -- although Microsoft claims it would be 
more expensive -- but their response to that is even if it's more 
expensive, it's producing a kind of knowledge within our 
economy which will have externalities for the growth of the 
economy generally.   
     So, rather than people being trained in technology to update 
the latest Windows patch to avoid the latest virus that spread in 
the Windows operating system, we're training people on how to 
actually manipulate and do things with code; that's what they 
need to do to be able to implement the new GNU/Linux 
operating system.  So, the knowledge that's being produced in 
the system is actually more valuable.  And when countries like 
Brazil can report, as I heard one report in a meeting in Portugal 
just two weeks ago, that they spend $1 billion in licensing fees 
every year while spending $471 million in a critical category of 
poverty programs, you can see what's driving these countries to 
try to find a different way to allocate their resources so that an 
extraordinarily large amount isn't being sent out of the country 
in ways that aren't actually inducing innovation or knowledge 
inside the country. 
     And finally, I want to resist a characterization that's framed 
this debate -- the idea that there's a traditional way of thinking 
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about IP in the context of software.  There's no tradition here.  
There's a history -- actually, the longest period of history -- of 
the development of software where software was not really a 
thing that was sold or commercialized as separate from the 
machines that it was run on.  In the original period of software 
development, software was a free add-on.  It’s uncertain what 
the licensing in that context was, but access to the source code 
was taken for granted.  Then there's a period of software where 
software's commercialized, proprietary software development.  
     There's no reason to privilege one view of software 
development over the other.  One view made sense at a certain 
stage of economic development, and another view makes sense 
at a later stage.  And the question we ought to be asking is, 
what business model makes sense given the particular kind of 
innovation we're trying to support in a particular market?  It 
would be different, depending upon the market, depending on 
the values at stake in each of the markets.  And rather than 
having the idea that there's the traditional Federalist way to do 
it and then a leftist, radical, crazy way to do it, we should 
recognize that there's just different business models here for 
how to support innovation in these fields. 
     Finally, here's the quiz: an application of all this to a 
particular case.  I'm going to report an "argument" that 
Microsoft has made about the GPL, and the basic conclusion of 
this argument is that GPL software, the software licensed under 
the Free Software Foundation's new GPL license, should not be 
supported as part of the ecosystem, at least when it comes to 
government.  This is what they say.  “The primary stimulus for 
innovation under the commercial software model is intellectual 
property protection.  The GPL forbids the commercial licensing 
of software that includes or is derived from GPL covered 
code.”  And three, finally, “Thus, if code is developed in a 
government-funded lab as derived from or licensed under the 
GPL, the private sector would be foreclosed from using or 
building upon this code to develop commercial products.”  I 
want to convince you why those claims are just not true and 
how subtly carefully you have those claims to make them 
sound convincing, but they are fundamentally untrue. 
     The first one -- “The primary stimulus for innovation under 
the commercial software model” -- the more accurate statement 
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here is, of course, one stimulus for the innovation of the 
commercial software model -- “is intellectual property 
protection.”  “One” is not “all.”  IBM is the clear example of a 
company that's innovating without this form of IP support 
behind it.   
     “The GPL forbids the commercial licensing of software” -- 
it's not commercial licensing of software the GPL prohibits; it's 
proprietary licensing for software.  Commercial licensing is not 
the same as proprietary licensing.  There's lots of commercial 
licensing that's not proprietary.  IBM and Apache are two clear 
examples of that.   
     And finally, “Thus, if code is developed in a government-
funded lab as derived from or licensed under the GPL, the 
private sector would be foreclosed”?  But that’s not correct:  
“the private sector”; one part of the private sector.  Not all are 
foreclosed. Only some are foreclosed.  For example, Microsoft 
might be foreclosed, but IBM is not foreclosed.  So, this is a 
model which might cause some exclusion, but it's not exclusion 
of the private sector, it's exclusion on some parts of the private 
sector.  Now, if you take that argument, though, and you try to 
identify the principles standing behind that, the principle that 
says we should not be supporting this form of software 
development because it forecloses this part of the marketplace, 
I think there's a principle here.    
     The principle is the government shouldn't support models of 
development that foreclose some business models.  The 
question is, does Microsoft really believe that?  If that's true, 
then the government shouldn't support proprietary products 
because that of course forecloses non-proprietary, open source 
development.  It shouldn't support patented products because of 
that, which of course forecloses those who can't use patented 
products in the context of their development model.  The only 
thing the government under this principle should support is 
work within the public domain.  Now, do they really support 
that as a principle behind how government should be funding 
innovation in this space?  The answer, I think, is obviously no.   
     Instead, what Microsoft should recognize is what the 
government should recognize and what should unite all 
discussion here: this form of innovation is one business model, 
and we should be evaluating business models as business 
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models compete, not evaluating a business model on the basis 
of incomplete ideological characterizations of what's at stake in 
these different business models.  I'm a total believer in free and 
open source software for many applications; I'm not a religious 
believer in the context of all applications, and neither should 
you be as well. Thanks very much.         
 
II.  A PROPERTY RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE ON INTELLECTUAL 
        PROPERTY RIGHTS, PRESENTED BY PROFESSOR SCOTT 
        KIEFF OF WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
        AND STANFORD UNIVERSITY HOOVER INSTITUTION 
 
PROFESSOR KIEFF:  Great, thank you very much for a very 
helpful overview, and let me try, if I may, to give a slightly 
different cut at a similar set of issues by giving what I hope is 
an IP perspective.  It's a perspective I want to give that looks at 
IP, and looks at open source through a particular lens, an 
economic lens, from the field of economics people sometimes 
call "law and economics", other people call "new institutional 
economics".  This is a take on economics, a group of economic 
works, that led to North and Fogel's Nobel Prize in 1993. 
     The idea of new institutional economics is to look at the 
impact that institutions have on economics.  When we talk 
about institutions, what we're thinking about is the whole set of 
laws and rules and norms, all the human imposed constraints 
that we have to deal with and the enforcement characteristics of 
those human-imposed constraints.  When we talk about the new 
aspect of new institutional economics, we're simply identifying 
that — unlike the old institutionalists who identified this effect 
— the new institutionalists try to characterize this effect, try to 
understand the effect. 
     For those of you who are familiar with other areas of law 
and economics literature, this is also connected to the theory of 
the firm work and transaction cost work that led to Coase’s 
Nobel Prize.  And the point of institutional economics is to 
recognize that no matter what institutional arrangement we deal 
with, we're going to have problems.  We just are.  There ain't no 
such thing as a perfect institution.  And so what we want to do 
is compare the problem sets and solution sets of different 
institutional arrangements, and what we want to do is pick the 
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problems we most want to solve, pick the solutions we most 
want to have, and recognize that in the end, we're still going to 
be stuck with a whole set of problems and we're going to have 
to pick those that we can best bear or mitigate, but we're always 
going to be stuck with a set of problems. 
     So, what we really want to do is think about all the different 
problems that are on the table.  Many of these are problems we 
all should be familiar with from our law school or basic 
economics training, right?  These are problems that people 
have.  People have to deal with incentives.  People engage in 
rent dissipation.  People have to process information in order to 
make decisions.  And no matter how much we try to be 
rational, we are not Spock, and so we engage in a variety of 
what people have called behavioralism problems.   
     As people try to interact with each other, we have 
transaction costs and agency costs.  People also have to 
coordinate with each other, and a big part of the open source 
movement is a story about coordination and cooperation.  And 
then at the institutional level, of course we recognize there are a 
variety of market failures, there are government failures, there 
are problems of public choice, problems of commons, anti-
commons, public goods.  Let's talk about some of those in more 
depth. 
     First, though, what we ought to think about when we think 
about IP is, what really does IP do for us?  Most people talk 
about IP -- and this is true in the kind of popular rhetoric, but 
it's also true in the academic literature -- this overwhelming 
dominant view is that you've got to give IP rights as some form 
of targeted incentive to specific people, inventors or creators, to 
engage in a specific activity, and then you have to monitor 
these people very closely because otherwise this right to 
exclude is going to restrict access unduly.  And so, we think of 
what we call the incentive access paradigm.  You have to give 
an incentive, and then you have to modulate it carefully in 
order to get access.  It's just not clear, though, that this is right.   
     First of all, it's not clear that incentives in this area really 
make sense as the dominant story.  So one of the stories about 
incentives is that if you don't give people incentives to do an 
activity that creates what you think of as positive externalities -- 
good for the rest of us -- they might not do enough of that 
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activity.  So you have to give them an added incentive to do 
that activity.  Yeah, but every time you walk down the street 
and look at somebody's private gardens that you can see, you 
realize that person created this positive externality for you 
without charging you a ticket price for seeing the garden.  They 
were able to figure out some industrial organization model, 
some way of getting through their day without charging you 
that price.  It turns out, if you go through life, you'll find that 
there are lots of positive externalities that occur without the 
need for these special targeted incentives. 
     It's also not clear that targeted incentives are effective 
because we often don't know what complex set of incentives an 
individual is dealing with.  For some people, all other things 
being equal, if you give them an extra buck, they'll be more 
responsive to you.  But all of the things aren't equal, and some 
people respond much more seriously to things like fame or 
leisure or power or you just don't know what drives them.  But 
without knowing for sure what that person's going to respond to 
at that time, providing what you have identified in the abstract 
as a positive incentive may in fact have no incentive effect. 
     One of the other problems with these direct incentive stories 
is then you have to develop a theory of merit about these 
incentives and IP rights.  Well, that's a difficult problem.  If you 
think about how you will then decide who gets IP rights, you'd 
have to develop a theory of merit.  And that blends into this last 
problem, which is that if you look at any of our positive law IP 
regimes, we don't ask whether a copyright author is really 
creative, whether she did a neat painting or a boring painting.  
And we don't ask whether an inventor was really bright.  We 
just care whether the copyright owner fixes in a tangible 
medium of expression some creative expression, and we just 
ask whether the inventor has filed an application that describes 
something that is new and non-obvious.  And so, this incentive 
story turns out just not to explain IP law. 
     It's also not clear that access really is helped.  One of the 
interesting things about this incentive-access paradigm is that 
property rights in IP can be very useful in increasing access to 
the subject matter covered by the IP right because IP rights 
allow the many complementary users of that asset to coordinate 
with each other.   
96 Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property Vol. 3 
 
     Think about an invention.  I have the idea in my head.  I 
may write it down, publish an article in Science, but that doesn't 
do very much for you.  You want to go to the store and buy a 
new product.  You want to buy a new service.  A lot of people 
have to coordinate with each other to get that product out of my 
head and into your hands onto the store shelves.  Investors, 
venture capitalists, manufacturers, marketers, laborers, 
managers, etc., all have to engage in this complex coordination-
commercialization dance, and the property right does a very 
good job of serving this coordination function. 
     Now, before you think of this coordination story as 
something new that I thought up, or something new-fangled 
that theoreticians generally have created to after-the-fact 
explain the patent system or IP rights generally, one of the 
things we see, if we go back to the history of those people who 
wrote at least the patent and trademark system in this country, 
is that they were not thinking about targeted incentives.  In fact, 
all they were focusing on was this commercialization-
coordination effect. 
     Now, there are a lot of ways to coordinate, and one of the 
important parts of the IP open source discussion is about 
different institutional structures for coordinating.  Families or 
norm-set communities and religious communities, other close-
knit communities, can do a very good job coordinating with 
each other.  There are a lot of benefits to coordinating through 
these groups.  You get some centralized control so you 
coordinate, you can rely on a whole set of informal norms 
rather than these formal legal rules so that transaction costs can 
be lower.  It turns out it can be cheaper to both administer, 
when you're within a small community, and it also can be much 
more effective.  People don't like to be ostracized from their 
communities and so enforcement in some ways is much more 
effective. 
     But there are a lot of problems when you coordinate within a 
community only.  Only people in that community get the 
benefit from that coordination effect.  They're closed to 
strangers.  Those people who are inside the community have a 
whole set of other problems.  All of their assets that make them 
a part of the community are specific to that community, there's 
a lot of asset specificity, which leaves these community 
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members more open to problems of strategic behavior and 
opportunism.  This makes up a whole body of literature in law, 
economics, and political science that people generally call 
crony capitalism, and that's the problem with relying only on 
small communities. 
     Firms can coordinate, too.  This is part of Coase and 
Williamson's 50-year debate about the theory of the firm.  The 
firm gives you centralized control.  It decreases transaction 
costs by bringing inside the firm what otherwise has to be done 
across the open market.  But there are a lot of costs to 
coordinating within a firm.  You start to get agency costs within 
the firm between the shareholders and the directors, between 
the directors and the managers, and between the managers and 
the other employees.  You also get another set of opportunism, 
and asset specificity problems for those who are locked into the 
firm.  And then of course hierarchy itself is a problem for 
innovation.  You tend to see decreased innovation any time you 
see hierarchy.  You see this within universities and within firms 
-- there's a generally recognized hit with hierarchy and 
innovation. 
     Government can coordinate.  You avoid a whole set of 
market failures.  In fact, this was the early work by Pigou on 
why you want to have government do things.  But again, you 
get all the same costs as firms plus a huge set of public choice 
problems.  We can talk about those in more depth later, if you 
want.   
     You also can try to engage in activities across the open 
market.  But that really is the core coordination problem.   
     And then lastly, you can coordinate with fame, right?  
Because any type of beacon effect will allow coordination.  
We'll see that Linus Torvalds does this with Linux.  But there 
are problems with relying on fame.  Who's going to be famous?  
Hard to know ex ante -- not everybody can be famous by 
definition, and you can't trade fame very well. 
     Property rights offer a whole set of benefits that each of 
these institutions don't offer.  And the argument here is not that 
you want to have property rights and not have those other 
institutions.  The argument is simply: you have property rights 
and have those other institutions.  
     When we think about property, there are going to be a whole 
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host of problems with it.  We recognize that there are problems 
with property rights.  We've seen a large body of literature that 
talks about how IP rights in particular can frustrate exchanges 
among people, interfering with downstream development of 
ideas.  This has been most carefully studied in the science area.  
Becky Eisenberg and Arti Rai have talked about it.  They talk 
about how you get the risk of decreased innovation and 
decreased development.  The argument is that people who try 
to engage in transactions over IP assets when doing basic 
development work will have to spend money on lawyers.  
There'll be transaction costs, there'll be cognitive biases and 
hold-outs, and overall more time, more money will be spent on 
the transaction and less time and money spent on doing science 
and doing development. 
     But it's also true that IP rights can help development and 
help science.  One of the things -- if you think about this as a 
basic economic problem of market failure, the idea here is that 
as people exchange assets, there will always be some market 
failure.  One of the things that we know is that those market 
failures are likely to be worse in markets that are thinner than in 
markets that are thicker, where we think of thin and thick as a 
function of how many players there are in those markets, how 
diverse those players are, and how many assets are in that 
market and how diverse those assets are. 
     If you think about the basic science world without patents, 
it's a world in which you’ve got kudos.  Promotion, tenure, 
fame, publications, grants, chaired professorships -- when you 
add patents to that market, it becomes kudos plus cash.  One of 
the things you do when you add IP rights to basic science is, in 
fact, you make the market thicker, not thinner.  You ought to be 
decreasing the number of market failures in that market, not 
increasing the number of market failures.  So, in fact what we 
would expect is that IP rights are both increasing the amount of 
wealth in the market and the diversity in that market.   
     Another story that gets told by Michael Heller and by Becky 
Eisenberg is the story about a kind of too many property rights 
leading to what some people call an anti-commons or other 
people call a patent-thicket.  But we have to think again about 
what is the true anti-commons problem.  In fact, Michael Heller 
characterized this problem and did wonderful work in this area, 
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but the true anti-commons problem is the small kiosk 
storefronts that were being used in the post-Socialist economy.  
Lots of members of the apparatchik class get to say, no, you 
can't use the empty storefront without asking me for 
permission. That’s why the venders were standing outside in 
the cold at kiosks instead of renting the empty storefronts.   
     When we start thinking about the "no" that's at play in that 
game, it's a "no" where there's no residual claimant.  You can't 
openly sell a "yes".  I mean, you can do it under the table, right?  
If you're a member of the government, you can offer that you'll 
be available for a bribe but you can't openly advertise, hey, 
come to me for a "yes".  There's no clarity because a potential 
user doesn’t know who to see to get a "yes", you don't know 
what to say to get a "yes", there's no certainty that once you get 
a "yes", you won't need a "yes" from another apparatchik.  
Some of the no votes of course are only of value as long as 
they're no.  And one of the things that we see is that the true 
anti-commons problem is really a problem of what we've seen 
in several different other areas of essentially permits or 
licenses.  It's not a problem of openly tradable property rights. 
     Think about the story this way.  If it were true that the need 
to get a thousand or two thousand IP rights bundled into one 
asset made it so expensive and the transactions so hard that I 
would never get that asset, then you wouldn't be able to buy a 
laptop computer for one click on the Internet for $1,500.  It 
would both cost a lot more money and in fact you wouldn't be 
able to do it with one click.  You'd have to talk to a lot of other 
people.  So, clearly someone has figured out a way around what 
are the several thousand IP rights in a laptop computer or a car 
or lots of other things we buy, and there hasn't been an anti-
commons problem at least for those assets. 
     Another example we might think about, of course, is what 
are the transaction costs associated with going to a Coke 
machine and buying a can of Coke?  You drop your 75 cents in; 
you get your can of Coke.  Right?  Well, if you look at basic 
science, people have figured out ways to do the Coke machine 
example as an even lower transaction-cost activity, which are 
the reagent freezer programs.  You don't even need to carry to 
the freezer your 75 cents like you need to carry it to the Coke 
machine.  You just go to the freezer, get your reagent, and then 
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at the end of the month, the reagent distributor comes by and 
counts the number of reagents that are missing and issues you a 
bill.  That's an even lower transaction-cost activity for the user 
than the Coke machine.  So again, in basic biological science, 
we've seen low-transaction cost solutions. 
     There's also the story of monopolies and the problem that 
somehow property rights are going to lead to monopolies.  
Larry talked about the example of how software used to be sold 
— well really, bundled with hardware as it was sold.  And of 
course, one of the interesting questions is, who came up with 
that idea?  Back in the late '60s, IBM came up with that idea 
and went to the U.S. Government and said to the government, 
you've got to get rid of these patents on software.  IBM's 
general counsel was Nicholas de Katzenbach, who had been 
Kennedy's attorney general.   
     The Johnson Administration, of course, was just a 
continuation of the Kennedy Administration, so he went to his 
friends and he said you've got to take this case to the Supreme 
Court.  Get rid of these patents on software, because when we 
sell people hardware we don't want them to have to pay later 
for software.  Now, that worked for IBM -- at least it worked 
for IBM at the time.   
     But the point is that was IBM's business model.  It was not 
necessarily everyone's business model.  And at least it's 
possible that had there been meaningful IP protection for 
software in the '70s and '80s, we'd have seen not Microsoft in 
the '90s as the single large player in the industry, but rather 
Microsoft as just one of a medium number of medium-size 
players in the industry.  The point here is that IP rights can in 
fact be associated with making industries diverse and thick and 
competitive, and it's the lack of IP rights in the software 
industry that led to Microsoft.   
     Well, that's a strong claim.  We certainly have seen that, 
though, in biotech.  We gave IP rights in biotech in 1980.  We 
didn't have them before 1980s, at least in basic biotech.  Before 
1980s, the U.S., Europe, and Japan had Big Pharma; after 1980, 
the U.S., Europe, and Japan still had Big Pharma.  Capital 
markets in the U.S. are open to the rest of the world and biotech 
is open to the rest of the world.  But only in the U.S., and only 
after 1980, you have a pool of about 1,400 or 1,500 small and 
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medium-size biotech companies.  So only in the one 
institutional structure where you have IP rights do you see a 
hyper-proliferation of competition.  And in the regimes where 
you don't see IP rights, you see just Big Pharma.   
     So, what are some lessons from all this for the debate 
between IP and open source.  Well, one of the arguments that 
open source people have made is that open source contracts are, 
in a sense, said to ask for less and in that way create more.  This 
is a story about property rights owners saying no too frequently 
and demanding too much in exchange for their yes.  These are 
absolutely great lessons, but at least it seems to me that they're 
lessons that we all already know.  This is what a good lawyer or 
a good business woman does when she goes to the table to 
negotiate.  She doesn't say no just for the sake of saying no to 
whatever her opponent requests.  Instead, she thinks seriously 
about making the pie bigger before she tries to think about 
carving it up because she knows that creating value for the 
person on the other side of the table may be a way for her to 
extract more value.   
     This strategy for licensing, which is central to the open 
source licenses, is a strategy that is not at all inconsistent with 
property.  And Larry points that out, too.  These, in fact, are 
tied often closely to property, but they rely on property rights 
and contract rights that are clear, that are fungible, that are 
divisible, that are bundle-able.  They have to be findable, and 
they have to be held by residual claimants who are themselves 
findable.  And one of the problems we had seen with at least 
some of the open source licenses is that as they start to stack, it 
becomes harder to find a resulting block of code that meets all 
of those criteria.  In fact, what you start to see is your own 
version of the anti-commons problem. 
     Open source is said to be a system that is fundamentally free 
for control, that it's distributive, that it's non-hierarchical, that 
it's democratic.  But one of the things we see when we look at 
open source is that it's richly associated with a variety of 
different forms of property, and different forms of property that 
may not function as well as IP.  Trade secrecy may be a big part 
of the game, in part because people won't give away as much as 
they say they're giving away, but in part because even when 
you give away, you have a problem of hiding in plain sight.  I 
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mean, if I give you a million lines of code, have I really given 
you information, or have I simply given you an information 
overload problem?  What's the chance you're going to read my 
million lines of code and get out of it the important information 
you want? 
     We also have the problem with fame, which we talked about 
early, which is that the Linux model is a model that is very 
tightly controlled.  Linus Torvalds and a set of his own 
lieutenants, or bishops or whatever metaphor you want to go 
with, control development of that kernel.  And they do so 
through a property right in fame -- a property right that is far 
less fungible, far less tradable than IP.   
     And then you see the bundling problem, which is that IBM 
recently decided that they're going to give away a lot of its 
patents in this area.  But of course, IBM is making its money 
today consulting, not selling software, and so it's totally rational 
for IBM not to care about patents.  Indeed, it might actually 
help IBM to have more uncoordinated development than 
otherwise because if you sell consulting services, you don't 
want a well developed software system.  The more frustrating it 
is to use the code, the more you hire a consultant.  IBM likes 
that. 
     Now, I very much agree -- and Larry made this point, too -- 
that ultimately this is not a story about all or nothing.  This is 
not a story about open source versus IP.  But it is a story about 
why you really need to think about having both of these types 
of approaches on the table.  It's going to be very hard to know 
ex ante which one is going to be useful, and so at least I'm a big 
proponent of avoiding both laws that are against or laws that 
require.  I think that each of the individual players in this game 
is going to figure out what's best for him or her at the time she 
engages in her transaction. 
     Let me just follow up by saying, there's a group of us who 
are working together on a project called the Hoover Project on 
Commercializing Innovation (www.innovation.hoover.org) that 
looks at the role that institutions have in technology 
development.  We look at it from the law perspective as 
corporate lawyers, IP lawyers, and contract lawyers.  In 
economics, we look at it in the fields of finance and IO.  We 
look in both the public and private sectors.  Most importantly, 
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we do basic research, we do consulting work, we both give and 
receive grants, and what we're really looking for is other people 
to play with.  And so we welcome your ideas, comments, and 
questions, and we'd love to collaborate. Thanks.     
 
III.  REBUTTAL AND RESPONSE SEGMENT WITH  
                      FOLLOW- UP QUESTIONS FROM PROFESSOR 
                      COLE 
 
PROFESSOR COLE:  So, Larry, would you like to respond to 
what Scott said?  
PROFESSOR LESSIG: I don't really think that there are many 
things we would be disagreeing about.  There's one very 
important idea that I want to make sure you focus on in what 
Scott was talking about.  This is what Scott called the anti-
commons problem following the work of Michael Heller.  
Michael Heller's work was picked up by James Buchanan, and 
James Buchanan has made a lot out of it.  But the anti-
commons problem is typically spoken of in the context of 
patents, where I think what Scott was saying in response to it is 
often very effective, that even though you've gotten many 
overlapping patents, there are markets that deal with that quite 
well.   
     It's actually much more interesting to imagine the anti-
commons problem in the context of copyright-related issues.  If 
you think about film, there's no such thing as a single copyright 
associated with film.  There are all sorts of copyrights 
associated with film.  There are some non-copyright rights 
associated with film, for example the residual rights that actors 
might have in their own persona or right of publicity in  a film.  
Through most of the history of films, those never created 
problems because through more of the history of film, the only 
thing you'd do is produce the film, display it in a certain 
predictable way, and sell copies in a predictable way.  And the 
markets took care of that very well. 
     But then came a radical change in technology -- digital 
technology -- and the way people wanted to get access to use 
these bits of content is very different.  And so now, if you want 
to go back and imagine licensing the rights as an ordinary 
consumer to take clips of film and use it in new ways or restore 
104 Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property Vol. 3 
 
films in digital form and spread them in lots of different ways.  
The transaction costs, the IP rights, associated with it are 
extremely high, and it is exactly an anti-commons problem 
because anyone in that whole project can veto the whole 
project. 
     So, in this context what's interesting is to see how new 
technology can produce problems that didn't exist in the 
original context in which the IP regime was set up, and 
therefore to be flexible about how to adjust the IP regime in 
response to these new technologies.  And when people call for 
the adjustment, we should resist calling them Communists 
because this is a claim about how to adjust an IP regime to 
changing circumstances.  It's not a claim about how we need to 
eliminate IP regimes.  This is a problem in the current debate 
that anybody who questions IP is, as Bill Gates referred to a 
bunch of us a couple months ago, a "communist".  
PROFESSOR KIEFF:  Maybe just a small follow-up, which is 
that on this anti-Communist issue I very much agree with you 
that the problem is much worse with copyright and rights of 
publicity.  I think to summarize or make the point as sharp as 
possible, I don't think the anti-commons problem is a function 
of the number of people you have to talk to.  So I think it's not a 
function of the number but the nature -- the nature of the rights 
that are at stake.  So the more clear those rights are, the more 
divisible they are, the more they are associated with a single 
residual claimant whose identity you can find, who's a living 
and breathing person that you can, you know, talk to.  The 
more that is true, the less likely the problem is, and it's not just 
a function of numbers.  
PROFESSOR COLE:  Let me ask, Larry, why would Microsoft 
engage in the kind of -- I mean, it appears that you might even 
characterize it as straightforward deception -- why would they 
engage in this?  Are they simply misguided, or is this rent-
seeking?  What stake do they have in preventing open source?  
PROFESSOR LESSIG:  Many of us thought that without the 
government stepping in, there was no way to stop the Microsoft 
monopoly.  I think the success of the GNU/Linux operating 
system is proof that many of us were wrong.  I mean, what 
we're seeing is this powerful spread of this competitor to 
Microsoft's platform.  And their response to this competitor is 
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exactly identical to their response to every other competitor, 
just through different means.  So their objective now is to find 
ways to convince people not to buy their competitor.  They 
can't compete on price, but what they can compete on is 
ideologies -- they get the government not to support it because 
it's Communism -- or they can compete on what's called 
"FUD", fear, uncertainty, and distrust.  For example, they go 
out and claim that if you use the GNU/Linux operating system, 
you're going to face all sorts of patent infringement suits 
because the patents associated with free software are terribly 
underspecified.   
     It turns out, you know, the most heinous example of that 
was SCO.  It turns out that SCO was funded by a lot of money 
from Microsoft, so this is the implementation of that strategy, to 
create uncertainty around this platform.  So, I just think it's 
competition by a different mode. 
     They historically have said — they historically only ever 
used software patents defensively.  But Craig Mundie, in a 
bunch of speeches about two years ago, said we should not 
expect that we will use software patents just defensively.  We're 
beginning to use them offensively.  We've got one of the most 
powerful, second only to IBM, patenting services going now -- 
patented absolutely everything, and it will be patented as the 
next line of defense of monopolization.  
PROFESSOR COLE:  Well, Scott, you've explained the role of 
how useful intellectual property can be, but your description 
doesn't seem to tell us where to draw the line.  Do we support 
the efforts of Microsoft in these types of activities, or how do 
we draw the line between the usefulness of open source and the 
usefulness of intellectual property?  
PROFESSOR KIEFF:  So, maybe a couple of answers.  To 
most directly answer the question, I think that you don't need to 
draw the line in the sense that -- and this is territory where 
Larry and I, I think, both agree and have already plowed, which 
is you need assets over which you're going to engage in trade 
and open source is just one type of trade.  So, in that sense, 
allowing people the option to select for themselves something 
that works, you know, is something that seems to make sense 
for everybody.   
     But on the question of how you decide what rights -- how to 
106 Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property Vol. 3 
 
ultimately shape the positive law regimes around different IP 
rights, one of the things that you see: so the government spent a 
year of hearings on the set of interactions between IP and 
antitrust, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade 
Commission.  And many of us testified about these issues over 
the course of a year, and at least the FTC issued a several-
hundred page Volume I report, which tells us that Volume II 
will come some day, and maybe more than Volume II.  And the 
National Academy of Science published a big report.  There 
had recently been a set of proposed changes to the positive law 
regimes trying to answer this question of what should be 
protectable and what shouldn't be protectable.   
     If you look at the set of recommendations in those proposals, 
one of the things you see about them is they happen to match 
almost perfectly with a survey that was done at about the same 
time by two economists, Iain Cockburn of BU and Rebecca 
Henderson at MIT.  Cockburn and Henderson went and talked 
to the top IP people at the top IP companies.  Now you know 
what that means -- vague topic -- but you can think of that as 
kind of the senior IP person at Hewlett-Packard.  And it turns 
out that the survey result matched perfectly the 
recommendations. 
     So, one response is, well, - the government got it right.  The 
government is doing exactly what the experts want.  And if you 
think of those people as experts, that's a reasonable conclusion.  
But those people might be experts — I mean, I suspect they are 
expert in their training — but they also happen to be people 
representing specific business interests at that time.  And this is 
very consistent with the kind of public choice or agency capture 
theory of government, which is that what government has done 
is exactly what a few of its largest customers have asked it to 
do.  But why would you ever think that that's good for 
everybody else? 
     In fact, one of the things about these recommendations is 
that they almost universally create a set of IP regimes that are 
devoid of strong IP rights.  They kind of create a system that is 
very much like the Japanese patent system, which has large 
numbers of low-value assets.  Keiretsus, large companies in 
Japan who compete with each other regularly, love the idea of 
large numbers of low-value assets because it's a great way for 
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big players to play together, and it's a great way for them to 
make sure that no small players enter the market.  Strong IP 
rights are a great way for David to beat Goliath.   
     But Goliaths who often fight against each other don't mind, 
and in fact do enjoy, fighting regularly against each other over 
small-value assets.  Why, you might ask; what's so good about 
litigating regularly over IP?  Well, what's good about it — you 
might say that's a transaction cost, but it turns out to be a very 
useful cost to spend.  It's useful because it's a great way to 
communicate across firms.  If I pick up the phone as chairman 
of Keiretsu One and talk to the chairman of Keiretsu Two — I 
have a serious trust problem.  How do I know, when I say that 
I'm going to go left that he's going to believe me, and how do I 
know when he says that he says he going to go right that I 
should believe him?  But if we actually are fighting regularly 
with each other, we can learn a lot more about which way we're 
going.   
     If I pick up the phone and call him, that is also a serious 
antitrust problem.  I'll take the left side of the field; you take the 
right side.  That's an antitrust problem.  But if we just fight with 
each other a lot in court over low-value assets and it just so 
happens I go left and you go right, that's not an antitrust 
problem or not as much of an antitrust problem.  Or if it is an 
antitrust problem, at least it's one that avoids treble damages. 
     And then lastly, in fact during the IBM settlement, one of 
the things that a lot of regulators in the U.S. and around the 
world have started to do is start to say to large companies, the 
more IP assets you have, the more we'll let you charge.  And so 
it becomes rational for these big companies to have large 
numbers of low-value assets rather than low numbers of high-
value assets simply because the antitrust regulators let them 
charge more.  So, this is at least a set of responses to a set of 
proposals about these basic questions about how you shape 
these IP rights.  
 
 
